This paper studies a regime change model in which, when a rebel leader mobilizes supporters, he faces a trade-off between increase the size of the rebel group and the risk of information leaks. I find that when the authority implement collective punishment to repress the rebellion, in which both rebel participants and those who knew about but did not report the rebellion are punished, it may result in a smaller rebel group size compared to targeted punishment, in which only the rebel participants are held accountable for their actions. Meanwhile, choosing collective punishment comes at a price, by forcing many to side with the insurgency, which may decrease the authority's survival chances. My findings also indicate that targeted punishment is more useful to prevent a revolution by ordinary citizens, while collective punishment should be adopted to prevent a coup staged by the politicians. Furthermore, when both authorities and rebel leaders compete for support by threatening retribution against the non-supporters, both parties tend to prefer the use of harsh methods to force civilians to choose sides.
Introduction
Coordination games have been widely used to study collective decisions under individuals' uncertainty about other players' private information. This model type is established based on an underlying assumption that the more players take the same action, the easier it is for that action to succeed. 1 The regime change model is one of its applications. The model focuses on what conditions or mechanisms can the insurgency motivate more participants (Bueno de Mesquita (2010) ). 2 However, a rebel group always faces a dilemma during the process of achieving a successful insurgency. On the one hand, rebel leaders want to motivate as many supporters as possible to participate in rebellions. On the other hand, maintaining confidentiality prior to taking action is crucial to success. As the number of people involved in an action increases, the probability of information leak also increases. A famous example in China is the failure of the Wu Hsu Reform in 1898, as the revolutionary party members were betrayed by Yuan Shikai, a potential supporter of a coup.
As such, I present a model to study the trade-off between increasing the number of supporters and the growing risk of information leaks faced by rebel leaders. This article advances the literature on the coordination game by allowing rebel leaders to choose their coalition size endogenously. This leeway makes it different from existing models in the sense that the players make decisions by inferring other players' actions according to the signals that each individual receives. In the current model, the individuals need to consider not only the signals they receive but also how the coalition size can affect other players' actions. The model provides a way to study the optimal coalition size that the rebel leaders should form under different environments.
The basic model can be used to answer another natural question in the regime change model, namely, how to prevent an insurgency in advance from the government's perspective. In this article, I focus on comparing two widely adopted ex ante punishment rules: collective punishment and targeted punishment. Collective punishment is favored because it takes advantage of people's fears to instill mistrust in the target population and encourages people to monitor each other's behaviour, which helps the authorities gather more information to prevent potential threats. Nevertheless, this harsh punishment has been gradually abandoned and replaced by targeted punishment, under which only those who participate in illegal actions are punished. Such abandonment is due to the idea that contemporary society upholds the idea of human rights. However, the effectiveness of these two punishments varies (in Section 2, I discuss historic and political evidence). In this article, I calculate the optimal rebel coalition size under these two punishment rules and identify the conditions under which punishment rule is more likely to prevent insurgencies.
In the model, a rebel leader wants to mobilize civilians to join a rebellion. Each player has a private type that represents individual anti-government sentiments. Given that the players dislike the government, they suspect that other players do too, although they are uncertain of their peers'
1 In a 2×2 game, two players need to take the same action to achieve a goal (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) ).
In a game with an infinite number of players, a threshold exists such that only a certain number of players need to take one action to achieve the goal. This condition is true in such models as the pricing debt model (Morris and Shin (2004) ) and the currency crisis model (Morris and Shin (1998)) 2 Other examples: Boix and Svolik (2013) ; Edmond (2011); Egorov et al. (2009) ; Persson and Tabellini (2009) ; Tyson and Smith (2013) , and Angeletos et al. (2007) and Little (2014) addresses a dynamic global game in regime change.
exact views. Once the leader decides to stage a rebellion, he can endogenously choose the coalition size by sharing his private type with coalition members. 3 Each member has three choices: i) to participate in the rebellion, ii) to maintain neutrality (i.e., be a free rider), or iii) to alert the government. The rebellion succeeds if and only if the number of participants is sufficiently large and the number of people who alert the government is sufficiently small. This model assumes two incentives that drive the civilians to desire a regime change. The first one is the regime change incentive, which measures how much an individual values the regime change through the personal anti-government types. The second, the pecuniary incentive, represents a direct financial benefit. Two interesting results are obtained. First, under collective punishment, the optimal coalition size is small and fixed, and it is independent from the rebel leader's type. Intuitively, the rebel leader wants to maximize the coalition size to guarantee the participation rate within the limits of potential betrayal. Moreover, no one wants to remain neutral under collective punishment, because free riders share the same risk as participants, but obtain fewer rewards if the rebellion succeeds. Owing to the lack of free riders, the optimal rebel group size should be fixed to satisfy the successful conditions of a rebellion. Conversely, a free riding problem may exist under targeted punishment because some players wish to remain neutral to avoid taking any risk regardless of the outcome. Given the free riding problem, a weak leader will find it hard to motivate others. Consequently, he needs to recruit more people to obtain a more sufficient number of participants than that under collective punishment. However, when the leader is strong enough to convince others that the rebellion has a high chance of success, the free riding problem can be eliminated and the optimal coalition size can remain as small as that under collective punishment.
Second, from the government's perspective, choosing collective punishment comes at a cost because forcing neutral citizens to pick a side might negatively affect the regime's survival probability. When the incentives are considerable, free riding motivates citizens to remain neutral to avoid risk. By choosing targeted punishment and thereby tolerating the existence of free riders, the authorities can reduce the number of people joining the rebellion. However, the collective punishment rule forces free riders to choose sides, potentially pushing more neutrals to side against authority because of the considerable incentives that the success of the rebellion offers. On the contrary, when the incentives to be a free rider are low, pushing free riders to choose sides by collective punishment may bring more people on the government's side, increasing the survival probability of the regime.
This framework provides valuable insights into the endogenous institution choice problem. When an authority faces a rebellion from civilians who are primarily driven by anti-government sentiment rather than any desire for pecuniary reward, targeted punishment may be effective in quelling the rebellion. In this case, being a free rider might provide a citizen with a regime change incentive if the rebellion succeeds, and could enable the citizen to avoid risk if it fails. Therefore, using targeted punishment prompts citizens to become free riders and lowers the rebellion's success probability. 4 However, when a ruler faces a threat from the people who are driven primarily by direct pecuniary reward or by their ambitions for power, collective punishment is more effective than that of targeted punishment. 5 Intuitively, using targeted punishment to encourage free riders does not work well in this scenario because free riders can only obtain regime change incentives, which hold less importance in this case. 6 Another extension of the model is the strategic competition between rebel leaders and the government. Assuming the leader can also threaten to punish the free riders when the rebellion succeeds, this harsh threat can eliminate free riders even under targeted punishment. In particular, when the authority prefers targeted punishment to encourage free riders, the rebel leader will use the harsh threat to push free riders into joining the rebellion. Therefore, the government must switch to collective punishment to defeat the rebellion. This explanation demonstrates why an equivalent retaliation strategy between governments and rebel groups is frequently observed. 7 Finally, I consider a special case in which a rebel leader threatens to punish traitors severely once the rebellion succeeds. In this case, collective punishment also results in a free rider problem because this severe threat to punish traitors increases citizens incentives to be free riders to avoid punishment from the rebel leader. This effect offsets the effect of eliminating free riders caused by the use of collective punishment. Therefore, for the leader, threatening traitors with severe punishment is more effective in reducing betrayal than recruiting participants.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical and political evidence. Section 3 indicates the model setup and solve the equilibria under collective punishment. Section 4 solves the equilibria under targeted punishment. Section 5 compares the regime's survival probabilities under two punishment rules. Section 6 is the comparative static analysis and the endogenous institution choice problem. Section 7 considers the strategic competition between rebel leaders and authorities. Section 8 studies the case that rebel leaders prefer using severe threat to punish traitors to avoid betrayal, and Section 9 is the conclusion.
4 For example, in the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and Lotus Revolution in Egypt, young people were motivated by anger over corruption and dictatorship. The direct monetary reward is relatively small for individual participants.
5 This situation is observed more often in coups as exemplified by Sophia Alekseyevna who led the rebellion of the Streltsy to seize the highest power of Russia in 1682 (Hughes (1985) ). 6 Some works under the regime-change topic emphasize the risk for coups to fail, and treat the military as a unitary actor (Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) ; Svolik (2009); Svolik (2013) ; Besley and Robinson (2010) ; Acemoglu et al. (2010) ). 7 One example is the civil war caused by the rebellion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. During the war, both LTTE and Sri Lankan military committed war crimes, including attacks on civilians and civilian buildings. Equivalent retaliation between the governments and rebel groups derived in this article is not the unique reason for war crimes in many similar situations. However, equivalent retaliation provides a possible explanation for civilians being harmed because of cruel competition when both sides want to obtain support from civilians.
Another example indicates the failure of collective punishment. During the latter years of the Republic of China era, Chiang Kai-shek pressed for the reintroduction of the Baojia system to suppress the uprising in Jianxi led by the communist party in 1934. After temporary success, the Baojia system was extended to the entire country, particularly in rural areas. However, this system became one of the instruments that propelled young peasants to join the communist party army after the World War II, which ultimately ended the regime of Chiang Kai-shek (Li and Ran (2005) , Xue (2005) ).
The difference between the Baojia system in Taiwan and China provides consistent evidence for our theoretical model. In Taiwan, the Japanese authorities used the Baojia system not just to suppress insurgency but also to improve local administration and economic development, such as building infrastructure, retaining sanitation, and preparing for natural disasters. As the economy and social security improved, the ordinary Taiwanese lost the incentive to join the uprising to change the regime. Therefore, when the exogenous shock from China came to Taiwan in the 1910s, collective punishment drew more residents who were against the uprisings to the side of the Japanese authorities. By contrast, the Baojia system implemented by Chiang Kai-shek only brutally suppressed the people. The system contributed nothing to improving the living conditions in rural China, and the years of civil wars only worsened the economic situation of the country. Therefore, given the choice between the government and the rebels, collective punishment forced a number of people to join the communist party's revolution.
Collective Punishment
{sec:set up}
Model Setup {subsec:basic
Players: There are two types of player: a rebel leader who plans to instigate a rebellion to overthrow the government; and a unit mass of population member, called followers, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Timeline: Stage 1: the leader receives his private type x 0 = θ + 0 , and each follower receives his/her type x i = θ + i .
x represents personal anti-government sentiments, which also measures how much an individual values regime change. θ is the common underlying state variable drawn by nature from a normal distribution N (m θ , σ 2 θ ). This value represents the true situation of the country such as the status of economic development or human rights. The larger θ is, the worse the situation. is an individual idiosyncratic variable drawn from a normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ). The players only observe x, not θ or , but the distributions are known by all players.
Stage 2: The leader chooses the coalition size L ∈ [0, 1] (L = 0 represents that no rebellion is staged). Then L members are randomly picked from [0, 1] to form rebel coalition.
Join
Remain neutral Turn in the leader 
L c and L s denote the number of players who join the rebellion and turn in the leader respectively. C and E are constants, with 1 > C > E > 0 and E + C ≤ 1. The participation condition indicates that a successful rebellion requires sufficient supporters (greater than C) to join the action. The maintaining secrecy condition implies that there cannot be too many the players (less than E) who turn in the leader.
Payoffs: When a rebellion succeeds, the leader receives a lump sum payment R, which represents the value of the entire country. When a rebellion fails, the payoff to the leader is −b as punishment from the government, with b > 0 (i.e., imprisonment, exile, or execution).
The follower's payoffs are summarized in Table 1 . When a rebellion succeeds, the payoff to a participant is T x i + t. T x i is the regime change reward representing how many he/she values the regime change, where T is the multiplier. t is the lump sum pecuniary reward for rebellion participants. If a rebellion fails, the payoff to a participant is −b.
The payoff to a neutral follower is vx i when a rebellion succeeds. This payoff indicates that a free rider can still benefit from the regime change but not with a direct pecuniary reward. 9 When a rebellion fails, the payoff to a neutral follower is −b
The player who turns in the leader receives the lump sum reward I from the government whether a rebellion succeeds or not, given that betrayal always occurs before the rebel group takes action. If a rebellion fails, a traitor keeps the reward I. If a rebellion succeeds, the payoff to a traitor is sx i − q + I, where sx i is the payoff from the regime change and −q as the punishment from the rebel leader, with q > I.
I assume the multipliers have T > v > s > 0, which means that for a given x i , the regime change benefits from directly involving the rebellion, indirectly involving, and siding the government follow a decrease order. Meanwhile I also assume that 
Discussion

{subsec:discus
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to discuss some assumptions in the model. When the leader forms the coalition, I assume he randomly chooses L member from [0, 1] without targeting specific individuals. In reality, although revolutionary vanguards may start to mobilize those they trust the most, they still cannot ascertain people's credibility. When people face choices involving high risk actions, such as revolutions or coups, betrayal can happen among even a closeknit group. This assumption in the model can be interpreted as meaning that the population in [0, 1] is the leader's most trusted group, such as the residents of their home town or their tribe, however, the leader cannot further distinguish the credibility of individual coalition members, which is related to their types but cannot be observe by the leader directly.
The model assumes the leader shares his true type with the coalition members without any cheap talk or signal manipulation (Baliga and Sjostrom (2012) , Bueno de Mesquita (2010) ). This is a technical assumption, because this article focuses on the scale of the rebel group, rather than the communication strategy. The truth-telling assumption represents the key concept that the larger the leader's type, the easier it is to mobilize a large group of followers. In reality, even if a rebel leader provides misleading information to motivate civilians, his communication skills, personality, and other factors can affect the efficacy of communications. Therefore, when the players receive a noisy signal from the leader, as long as that signal is distributed as a mean preserving spread from the leader's type, it does not change the main purpose of this paper, but increases the computational complexity.
One condition for a successful rebellion is L s < E, with E > 0. E can be viewed as the monitoring threshold chosen by the government exogenously. This assumption can be shown in the statement that the government only begins to suppress a rebellion if sufficient evidence is collected. It reflects the facts that rumors about revolutions or coups always exist in any regime. Authorities cannot afford to take action with every single rumor, instead they set up a threshold of quantity of evidence, beyond which they begin serious investigations and suppression activities. The details of choosing a value for E are discussed in Section 6.
This model is different with global game, because it includes the individual type into the utility function, which violates the two-sided limit dominance property (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (2003) ). 11 The model in this paper develops the idea that no matter how antigovernment a citizen, it is never a dominant strategy to rebel. This is because, if a citizen believes no one else will attack the regime, he is certain the regime will not fall, so he does not want to rebel (Bueno de Mesquita (2010) , Baliga and Sjostrom (2012) Applying Bayes' rule for the case of normal prior and normal signals, the leader, after observing his own signal, acquires a posterior belief about θ that is distributed normally with mean m 0 = λx 0 + (1 − λ)m θ and variance σ 2 = λσ 2 , where λ = σ 2 θ σ 2 θ +σ 2 . Intuitively, the more anti-government a leader is, the more anti-government he believes others are likely to be. Similarly, i, after observing his/her own type and the leader's type x 0 , acquires a posterior belief about θ that is distributed normally with meanm i = ψx 0 + (1 − ψ)λx i + (1 − ψ)(1 − λ)m θ and varianceσ 2 = ψλσ 2 , where ψ = λ 1+λ . A pure strategy for the leader is a mapping L(x 0 ) : R → [0, 1]; from the personal type into a decision of the size of rebellion coalition L, in which L = 0 represents the case that the leader does not stage a rebellion. A pure strategy for follower i ∈ G is a mapping s(
; from the personal type, the leader's type and the coalition size into a decision of turning in the leader (-1), remaining neutral (0) or joining a rebellion (1). The solution concept is a pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), and I focus on those pure strategies PBE of the full game in which the followers follow cutoff rules.
The first result in the following proposition indicates that when a follower believes no one else will join a rebellion, the best strategy for his/her is to turn in a leader always. During this scenario, a leader will not stage a rebellion.
{PA:trivialeq} Proposition 1. There is always an equilibrium of the game that all followers in the coalition turn in the leader, and the leader does not stage a rebellion.
Next, I focus on analyzing the decisions of followers with finite cut-off rules through backward induction, then I revert to the decision of the leader.
11 The limit dominance implies that participating the rebellion is a dominant strategy for the sufficiently high type players and turning in the leader is a dominant strategy for the sufficiently low type players 12 Another example: the player with xi < −q+I−t T −s always want to side the government no matter the regime change probability. This example reflect some phenomenon in the reality that even if a government will definitely be overthrown, it will still gain some support from officials' relatives, or some religious factions, or the residents from the dictators home town.
Followers' decisions:
{subsec:PA_fol
In the situation in which a type x 0 leader stages a rebellion with a coalition size L, the expected payoff for a type x i follower to join the rebellion is expressed as follows:
is a follower's assessment of the probability of regime change given his/her own type x i , the leader's type x 0 , the coalition size L, and the strategies of the other followers s −i . Similarly, the expected payoff for being neutral is
This scenario implies that acting as a free rider is not a wise choice for the followers with x i > − t T −v as they must share the same risk as the participants, despite obtaining a smaller reward. When
. This scenario implies that followers who like the current regime should side with the government rather than wait for a regime change. Therefore, remaining neutral is a weakly dominated strategy for followers according to the assumption that There may exist cutoff equilibria with positive participants, in which followers switch strategies according to a finite threshold k(x 0 , L). If such a threshold exists, the equilibrium strategy for followers should be:
Next, I perform the following steps to discuss the existence of finite k(x 0 , L): 1. It is first necessary to derive the equilibrium conditions to solve the finite k(x 0 , L) for a given x 0 and L. 2. Then the conditions related to x 0 and L that are necessary for the existence of finite k(x 0 , L) must be computed.
Step 1. First, the subject belief of the regime change probability need to be calculated for follower i. From the perspective of i, the total participants are L c = L(1 − Φ( k−θ σ )), where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Therefore, the participation condition L c > C should be equivalent to
Given that the conditions for a successful rebellion are L c > C and L s < E, 13 From the perspective of i, when all other players follow the same cutoff rule, then the number of followers with xi > k ⇒ i > k − θ should join the rebellion. Since follows N (0, δ ) and the coalition size is L. This grouping is expressed as Lc = L(1 − Φ( k−θ σ )). Since the participation strictly increases in θ (i.e., the worse the underlying situation of the country is, the more participants are recruited).The right-hand side of the inequality represents the minimum θ, in which the participation condition is maintained. θ must be greater than both
to ensure the success of the rebellion. The minimum level of θ that is required for regime change can be referred to as
Recall that i believes θ is normally distributed as N (m i ,σ 2 ) derived in Section 3.3. Therefore i's subjective belief of the regime change probability is
It is worth to point out that when
Intuitively, followers care more about whether the number of participants is adequate, rather than maintaining secrecy during decision-making when the coalition size is small. In other words, the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition in this scenario. On the contrary, when
. It means that the maintenance of secrecy is more important than recruiting a sufficient number of participants to mobilize followers when the coalition size is large (i.e., the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participant condition).
Follower i's subjective belief must be consistent on the equilibrium path, i.e. k, must be applied by all followers. Given the monotonicity of the payoff functions in x i , the follower whose type is equal to k would be indifferent to both joining the rebellion and turning in the leader. Therefore, with a given x 0 and L, the equilibrium condition for a finite k should be:
By plugging in equation (2), this equilibrium condition can be rewritten as (4), exclusively includes the information shared by the leader, i.e. x 0 and L. It can be referred as the "influence" exerted by the leader on followers. Then, the relationship between x 0 , L and the existence of the finite k can be derived by analysing influence M . Here it is necessary to introduce a new notation to denote the left hand side of (4)
The next lemma describes the shape ofû(k, M ), which is illustrated in Figure 1 .
{u_hat propert Lemma 1. For all parameter values:
and lim
(All proofs are in the appendix)
The shape ofû signifies that there are generically two finite cutoff rules (the curve ofû(k, M ) in Figure 1 ). Given M (x 0 , L), I label the low k l (x 0 , L) and the high k h (x 0 , L) (for low and high). Sinceû(k, M ) increases in M , it implies a knife-edge case that a minimal M min exists such that finite k can be solved from equation (4) for any M ≥ M min . In this knife-edge scenario, only one finite threshold exists, that is, k l = k h (the curve ofû(k, M min ) in Figure 1 ). For any M < M min , no finite k can be solved from the equilibrium condition (the curve ofû(k, M ) in Figure 1) .
From Lemma 1, it is easy to find that M min represents the minimal influence level that the leader must possess to motivate positive participants. By the definition of M (x 0 , L), it is an increasing function of x 0 , hence there exists a x min 0 which represents the least type of leader who can exert the influences on the followers above M min . In other words, when the leader's type is sufficiently weak (x 0 < x min 0 ), no positive participants can be convinced to join the rebellion regardless of L.
x 0 increases with L because the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition. Consequently, as long as the leader chooses L such that
positive amount of followers will join the rebellion. When the coalition is large (L ≥ E + C), the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition.
to recruit positive participants. The above discussion can be displaced in Figure 2 and the results are summarized in the next lemma.ûû and a constant M min such that: 1. For any x 0 < x min 0 , there is no finite k which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium. 2. For any x 0 ≥ x min 0 , finite k(x 0 , L), which is consistent with equilibrium, exists if and only if either 
represents the boundary composed of x0 and L such that condition (4) holds. When L > E+C, i.e. the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition, curve
represents the boundary composed of x0 and L such that condition (4) holds.
{fig:PA}
Since k solved from the equilibrium condition (4) are not unique, I follow the equilibrium selection criterion applied by Bueno de Mesquita (2010) to assume that no follower adheres to threshold k h , in which the followers' strategies are unstable from the perspective of a dynamic learning procedure. 14 Moreover, the strategy with k h is also counter-intuitive: fixing all other parameters, when the reward from turning in the leader, I, increases, rebellion participation increases, i.e., k h decreases.
Assumption 1. (Equilibrium Selection) Followers do not adopt the strategy using
is a function of x 0 and L. x 0 exerts only one effect on k. When x 0 increases, the followers believe that anti-government sentiments are high. As a result, participation is high. In other words, a high-type leader can persuade many followers to join the rebellion. L induces two varied effects on k depending on its scale. When L is small, the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition; an increase in L causes followers to believe that participation increases as a result. Consequently, the cutoff threshold k decreases. When L is large, the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition. Therefore, k increases when L increases beyond E + C. As a result, participation is low. These facts are summarized as follows:
{PA: L prop} 14 Details are cited in Bueno de Mesquita (2010) Assumption 2 Corollary 1. 1.
3.5 Leader's decision:
For a given x 0 and under Assumption 1, if the leader selects the coalition size L > 0, his expected payoff is
) represents the leader's subjective belief of the probability of regime change.
When the leader decides to plot a rebellion, his optimal choice of L is to minimize the cutoff threshold k(x 0 , L), through which he can recruit more participants. More precisely, when L < E+C, the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition. In this case, enlarging L can attract more participants by decreasing k (Lemma 1), therefore u 0 (x 0 , L) increases with L. When L > E + C, the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition. As a result, reducing L is more effective in recruiting participants, and u 0 (x 0 , L) decreases with L. Therefore, the best choice for a leader is E + C, which helps the leader achieve the maximal influence over followers by balancing the participation and maintaining secrecy conditions. This result is summarized as follow.
{PA: best L}
Lemma 2. For given x 0 , u 0 (x 0 , L) increases with L when L < E+C and decreases when L > E+C. Therefore, the optimal coalition size is L * = E + C at which u 0 (x 0 , L) achieves the maximal value.
Lemma 2 suggests that L * is independent of x 0 under collective punishment. This is because if L * changes with x 0 , the effect of the change in L * offsets the effect from the change of x 0 concerning either an increasing number of participants or a decreasing number of traitors. This result provides us an interesting finding that the rebel group size should be always kept small under collective punishment no matter how strong the non-government motivation is. Intuitively, the optimal choice for the leader is to maximize the coalition size under the tolerance of potential betrayal. Meanwhile, since collective punishment does not leave rooms for free riders. Any follower who is approached by the rebel leader has to choose a side. From the leader's perceptive, any coalition size smaller E + C can undermine the opportunity of recruiting sufficient supporters, on the other hand, any coalition size greater than E + C increases the risk of betray beyond too much. Therefore, the leader should choose the coalition size slight larger than the necessary scale C by adding additional E followers which is the threshold he can afford for the betrayal.
Join
Remain neutral Turn in the leader Since the leader's expected utility function for staging a rebellion is a monotone increasing function of his type x 0 , i.e. it is easy for a leader with a high type to persuade followers to join a rebellion. Therefore, a unique threshold x * 0 exists for a rebel leader to decide whether to stage one.
{PA: start reb Proposition 3. There exists a unique x * 0 such that the leader does not start a rebellion when x 0 < x * 0 , and starts a rebellion with the coalition size E + C when x 0 ≥ x * 0 .
Targeted Punishment {sec:pp}
Borrowing the method developed in the previous section, the discussion can be extended to analyse targeted punishment. In this case, the government only punishes the participants if the rebellion fails, and the player who remains neutral (free rider) receives zero payment ( Table 2 ). The rest of the model setup is the same as collective punishment in Section 3.
Followers' decision {subsec:PP_fol
Since the free rider will not be punished when the rebellion fails, remaining neutral is not always a weakly dominated strategy under the targeted punishment rule. Two potential cutoff strategies may be considered on the equilibrium path. First, a one cutoff threshold k(x 0 , L) may be generated such that a follower joins a rebellion if his/her type is greater than k, and betrays the leader otherwise (referred to as the one-cutoff strategy). Second, a two cutoff thresholds pair (k c , k s ) with k c > k s may be generated. In this case, a follower joins the rebellion if his/her type is greater than k c ; he/she betrays the leader if his/her type is less than k s ; and he/she remains neutral if his/her type is between k c and k s (referred to as the two-cutoff strategy).
Next, I focus on determining under what conditions of x 0 and L, finite thresholds k, and/or (k c , k s ) exist which are consistent with the cutoff equilibrium. 15 Similar as the discussion under collective punishment, whether the leader can motivate positive participants is determined by the influence he can exert on the followers, which is a function of x 0 and L. For a given x 0 , when a small L is chosen, the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition in the followers' decision-making, then the influence M =
, positive followers will join the rebellion. Similarly, when a large L is chosen, the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition, then M =
, the leader can recruit positive participants. When the leader's influence is low but enough to motivate positive participants, some followers will choose to remain neutral to avoid the risk of rebellion failure. In this scenario, two cutoff thresholds, k s and k c can be found which are consistent with the equilibrium. Furthermore, the number of free riders shrinks when the leader's influence increases. 16 It is because that the marginal benefit of switching from a free rider to a participant is large than that of switching from a traitor to a free rider, when the followers believe that regime will change with a high probability. Consequently, free riders are eliminated (one-cutoff strategy) when the leader's influence is sufficiently large. Natural, a threshold M med for the leader's influence should exist, beyond which only one cutoff threshold k can be found i.e. no free rider. These results are summarized in the next lemma and illustrated in Figure 3 {PP:le:eq exis Proposition 4. 1. There exists a constant M med such that, for any given x 0 and L, one cutoff threshold k(x 0 , L) exist, which is consistent with the equilibrium, if and only if 
Since Lemma 4 indicates the existence of the lower bounds of the leader's influence to motivate positive participants (M min C and M min C ), then it also implies that when the leader's type is sufficiently low, no participant can be recruited regardless the coalition size. Furthermore, since M med is the lower bound of the leader's influence to eliminate the free riders, it implies that if the leader's type is not sufficiently high, he cannot get rid of the free riding problem. Similar as the case under collective punishment, when the finite cutoff rules exist on the equilibrium path, they are not unique. I follow the same equilibrium selection criterion (Bueno de Mesquita (2010) ) to assume that when finite cutoff rules exist, followers do not adopt any strategy associated with the large thresholds. 17 16 More precisely, for a given coalition size L, the number of free riders shrinks when x0 increase. For a given x0, the number of free riders shrinks when the influence increases by choosing different L 17 More precisely, in the one-cutoff strategy, given a x0 and L, when the finite threshold exists, k solved from the For a given x 0 , the optimum coalition size chosen by a leader balances the participation and maintaining secrecy conditions if he wants to plot a rebellion. Corollary 2 shows that when x 0 > x med 0 , the leader can achieve an influence level greater than M med to eliminate free riders. Therefore, the balance point for the participation and maintaining secrecy conditions can be achieved with L * (x 0 ) = E + C, which is exactly the same as that under collective punishment. When x min 0 < x 0 < x med 0 , the maximum influence the leader can exert cannot reach M med any longer. Because the leader knows some coalition members will be free riders in this situation, he has to recruit more followers to satisfy the participation condition than the case when no free rider exist. Furthermore, as x 0 decreases, it becomes harder for the leader to persuade people join the rebellion, which leads to the increase of free riders, as a consequence, the leader has to enlarge the coalition sizes further. equilibrium conditions is entirely the same as it is solved from (4) in Section 3. So there exist two thresholds, k l and Proposition 5 implies that different punishment rule does not affect a high type leader's choice of the coalition size. Large coalition size occurs only when the leader is weak. Since a high type leader also implies a high chance for the regime change, it indicates that a small scale rebel group maybe a more vital threat to the government. Finally, it is easy to show that a starting point x * 0 exists for the leader to stage a rebellion under the targeted punishment rule.
{PP: leader de
Proposition 6. A unique x * 0 exists such that the leader would not start a rebellion when x 0 < x * 0 , and start a rebellion with the coalition size L * (x 0 ) when x 0 ≥ x * 0 .
5 Survival Probability Analysis {sec:survival}
After calculating equilibria under two punishment rules, the question of which rule is more likely to prevent a rebellion should be addressed. Recall thatθ(x 0 , L) is the minimum level of the underlying situation variable θ required for regime change. On the equilibrium path, for a given θ, once a rebellion is staged by a type x 0 leader with the optimal coalition size L * (x 0 ), the rebellion succeeds if and only if θ >θ(x 0 , L * (x 0 )). Sinceθ is clearly a monotonic decreasing function of x 0 , ax 0 exists such thatθ(x 0 , L * (x 0 )) = θ. Intuitively,x 0 (θ) is the minimum leader's type to implement a successful rebellion.x 0 (θ) is a decreasing function of θ because when the underlying situation of the government worsens, the leader can use a smaller x 0 to motivate followers. Therefore, a rebellion is staged and succeeds if and only if the leader's type x 0 is greater than both x * 0 andx 0 (θ). Now the regime's survival probability can be written as:
To avoid confusion when we discuss different punishment rules, hereafter we employ CP and T P as superscribes to refer the collective and targeted punishment respectively. Under targeted punishment, when the rebellion starting point x * T P 0 is greater than x med 0 , followers only use the one-cutoff strategy on the equilibrium path, which is exactly the same as the equilibrium strategy under the collective punishment rule. Consequently, two punishment rules have the same effect in preventing a rebellion. 18 I then focus on the case when x * T P 0 < x med 0 . The next two propositions indicate that when the underlying situation of a government is good, both the collective and targeted punishment rules have the same effect in preventing rebellions, whereas when the underlying situation worsens, they might result in disparate survival probabilities for a government. In the first case, when the regime change incentive T and v are sufficiently large with relatively small difference, targeted punishment has a higher survival probability than that of collective punishment. Intuitively, although a large
means that the leader's starting point for a rebellion is high, in other words, leading a rebellion is unattractive to the leader. Then, both punishments provide the regime with the same survival probability.
T makes joining a rebellion attractive, a large v implies that being a free rider is an equally good choice, without taking risk. However, given that no free rider problem exists under collective punishment, this harsh punishment forces those followers who could be free riders under targeted punishment to choose a side. The collective punishment rule could urge more followers to the side opposing the government when both T and v are large and the underlying situation θ is poor. This result is summarized as: {Sur:prop: PP Proposition 7. When T − v = g where g is a constant, and v is greater than a constantv, then there exists aθ such that when θ ≤θ, both collective and targeted punishment rules have the same survival probability, i.e., P CP sur (θ) = P T P sur (θ); when θ >θ, targeted punishment has a higher survival probability, i.e., P CP sur (θ) < P T P sur (θ).
The next proposition indicates that if v −s is small enough, and v −s and q −I are proportional, collective punishment is more effective in preventing a rebellion. Intuitively, when remaining neutral is unattractive to followers in comparison to turning in a leader, and the threat from a leader (q) is not significantly large than the government reward (I), collective punishment is a better choice for a government.
{Sur:prop: PP Proposition 8. When q − I = (v − s)h where h is a constant, and v − s is less than a constant v , then there existsθ such that when θ <θ , both collective and targeted punishment rules have the same survival probability, i.e., P CP sur (θ) = P T P sur (θ); and when θ >θ , collective punishment has a higher survival probability, i.e., P CP sur (θ) > P T P sur (θ).
Proposition 7 and 8 indicate that targeted punishment allows institutions some flexibility by allowing free riders when the underlying situation worsens. Therefore, targeted punishment provides two paths for the prevention of a rebellion. The first is a direct method for increasing traitors, and the second is an indirect method for allowing free riders, which use the people's hesitation to join a risky action. However, collective punishment employs only the direct method to prevent a rebellion by attracting traitors. The flexibility offered by targeted punishment is not functional when the incentive for being a free rider is small. However, targeted punishment is more likely to prevent rebellion than collective punishment when joining a rebellion and being a free rider are both attractive.
Comparative Static and Endogenous Institution Choice
{sec: compara I begin with a discussion of t, the pecuniary reward for rebellion participants. Joining a rebellion becomes increasingly attractive as t increases. As a consequence, more participants and fewer traitors are expected under both the collective and targeted punishments. However, the increase in t has disparate effects on the participants and free riders under targeted punishment. The former can benefit both from the increases in the direct monetary reward and the rebellion's probability of success, while the latter can only benefit from the increase in the rebellion's probability of success. Therefore, as t increases under targeted punishment, the role of the free rider problem decreases, and thus the difference between two punishment rules reduces.
{CS: Prop: t Proposition 9. For a given θ, when t is sufficiently large, there is no free rider under targeted punishment; and both the collective and targeted punishment rules provide the same survival probability for the government, i.e., P CT sur (θ) = P T P sur (θ).
Proposition 9 implies that the leader can attract more supporters by sharing his return. This proposition accords with historic facts, particularly regarding small coups during which the leader promises a huge reward to recruit key supporters. However, recruiting by increasing reward t also creates other problems that are beyond the scope of this paper, but are interesting to mention for future research. 19 First, promising huge rewards to supporters reduces the payoff for a leader, which decreases the incentive for a leader to stage a rebellion. Meanwhile, a huge reward also presents an issue of commitment; the leader might renege on his promise once he assumes the highest power. Second, a constraint for increasing t might exist. For example, the Chinese Communist Party promised land reform to attract farmers to join a revolution. However, natural local constraints and a large population drew an upper bound for rewards to village families.
Another interesting parameter is the monitoring threshold, E. When E decreases, it implies that a government enhances the monitoring of the targeted population, which makes it harder for a rebel group to achieve success. 20 The discussion can be extended to the question about the optimal choice of E from the government's perspective. Assume the government is subject to a cost function, B(N, E), when monitoring a targeted population, where N is the exogenous population size and E is the monitoring threshold that the government sets up. It is also reasonable to assume that B increases with the size of the target population (N ), and decreases with the monitoring threshold (E). When the primary threat to a government is an insurgency begun by a large population, for whom the regime change incentive is more important than the direct monetary reward (large T and v, small t). According to Proposition 7, selecting targeted punishment provides a higher survival probability for the government than selecting collective punishment because the former allows free riders. Considering that monitoring the entire population is costly (large N ), adopting targeted punishment can also allow the government to select a high E to save on costs. This scenario can be used to explain revolutions instigated by ordinary civilians. In general, when an ordinary citizen decides to join a risky revolution that aims to overthrow a dictator, the regime change incentive is more important than the direct monetary reward. An example of such a case is the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, during which young men were motivated to join protests because of anger 19 I thank Scott Gehlbach and Mehdi Shadmehr for raising this issue. 20 It is easy to find k and x * CP 0 under collective punishment and k, k c , k s , and x * CP 0 under targeted punishment all increase when E decreases. Briefly, selecting a small E is effective in preventing a rebellion. that spread through social networks. The dictatorship of Ben Ali was overthrown in a month. 21 Under this circumstance, a collective punishment rule does not help maintain the regimes stability, owing to a lack of tolerance for protests. 22 On the contrary, when a government faces a potential rebellion plotted by a small population primitively driven by ambitions for power or direct monetary reward (large t, small v, and s), such as palace coups, collective punishment might be a good choice for the government, according to Propositions 8. The government might also afford to select a small E to prevent the rebellion. This scenario can explain why dictators prefer using secret police to monitor officials to prevent coups. In addition, punishment can be implemented frequently without transparently enforcing the rule of law.
Cruel Competition {sec:competiti
In the previous sections, I focus on the case in which the leader punishes only those who betray him once a rebellion succeeds. In reality, a rebel group leader can employ rewards and threats to recruit coalition members, so I extend the discussion to a case in which the leader can also threaten to punish free riders when a rebellion succeeds.
When the leader punishes followers who remain neutral once a rebellion succeeds, the payoff for a free rider is vx i − q. I call this scenario the harsh threat scenario to distinguish it from the previous case, referred to as the easy threat scenario hereafter, in which the leader punishes only traitors. When the government chooses collective punishment, being a free rider is a dominated strategy, and the harsh threat from the leader does not change the results presented in Section 3.
When a leader switches from an easy threat to a harsh threat under targeted punishment, the original free riders with high types join a rebel group because being a free rider becomes less attractive than joining a rebellion when they think the probability of a rebellion's success is high. However, free riders with low types betray the leader because such actors feel the probability of success is low, and thus would rather turn in the leader to gain some reward from the government than wait for the punishment from a leader as free riders. These changes imply that the size of free riders decreases under a harsh threat scenario. On the equilibrium path, free riders do not exist when the punishment q is large enough. The following lemma summarizes this result.
{CC: le: free
Lemma 3. Under targeted punishment and a leader chooses a harsh threat, if q is large enough, then free rider does not exist.
21 More details about the Arab Spring can be found in Anderson (2011) . The effect and role of social media during the Arab Spring Revolution can be found in Howard et al. (2011) .
22 Another authority with a low tolerance for protests is China, which is subject to a large cost. Although no evidence shows that the color revolution can happen in China (Swartz (2011) ), the cost of stability maintenance (Weiwen), such as managing social protest or Internet sanction, continuously increases from CNY 549 billion in 2010 to CNY 769 billion in 2013. This cost increases faster than China's military expenditure (Benney (2013)) Now, I assume that the condition for Lemma 3 holds. Consider a 2 by 2 game played by a government and a rebel leader. The government can choose either the collective or targeted punishments, and the leader can choose either the easy or harsh threat. I assume that: 1) the leader always wants to start a rebellion; 23 and 2) the government's payoff is −b when the regime is changed. For a given θ, the payoff table is listed below. The first payoff in each cell is the expected payoff for the leader, and the second payoff is for the government. P 1 sur (θ) and P 2 sur (θ) are the survival probabilities for the government when remaining neutral is a dominated strategy and when it is not, respectively. 24
For a given θ, the government prefers Collective to Targeted when P 1 sur (θ) < P 2 sur (θ). In this case, the leader prefers Harsh to Easy , because when the government does not want to use collective to force potential free riders to choose sides, a leader must urge free riders to choose sides because most would join the side of the leader when they cannot remain neutral. (Harsh, Collective) and (Harsh, Targeted) are two pure strategy equilibria. If P 1 sur (θ) > P 2 sur (θ), then (Easy, Collective) and (Harsh, Collective) are two pure strategy equilibria because the leader is indifferent between these two choices when the government prefers Collective.
From the preceding discussion, it is simple to find that the use of a harsh way to oppose the other side is always an option for one side on the equilibrium path. Moreover, for any θ, (Harsh, Targeted) is always an equilibrium. This result provides a possible explanation for why we often observe an equivalent retaliation strategy between governments and rebel groups in reality. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are two cases that fit this explanation. v−s , remaining neutral may not be weakly dominated strategy under collective punishment. Similarly to Section 4, there may also exist one-cutoff strategy or the two-cutoff strategy for the followers.
In the case that only traitors are punished by the leader when the rebellion succeeds, the leader's threat is more useful in reducing traitors than increasing participants. When the leader's 23 When the leader always starts a rebellion, I assume when his type is less than x min 0 under both punishment rules, he can choose any coalition size, because the rebellion will fail for sure. Also the regime's survival probability becomes Psur(θ) = 1 − P (x0 >x0(θ)). Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 still hold.
24 Actually, P type increases, the followers believe that the rebellion has a high chance to win. Consequently, more followers would like to switch from being traitors to free riders to avoid the treat from the leader than those who switch from free riders to participants. As a result, the number of free riders increases with the leader's type, meanwhile, the leader will increase the coalition size to not only increases the participants but also deduce the rate of traitors. However when the coalition size increases, some traitors always exist, therefore increasing a coalition's size is limited by an upper bound to avoid breaking the maintaining secrecy condition. These results are summarized as follow: , only onecutoff strategy for the followers exists on the equilibrium path, and the optimal coalition size for the leader is L * T R = E + C. 3. When x 0 ≥ x med 0 T R , only two-cutoff strategy for the followers exists on the equilibrium path; and the optimal coalition size for the follower is L * T R (x 0 ) > E + C which increases with x 0 4. lim T R is the optimal coalition size which represents the balance points for the participation and maintaining secrecy conditions. 4. M min T R represents the influence threshold separating the one-cutoff strategy and no finite cutoff case. 5. M med T R represents the influence threshold separating the one-cutoff strategy and the two-cutoff strategy.
{fig:last eq}
Under targeted punishment, the results about the equilibrium strategies and optimal coalition sizes are very similar to Proposition 10. Only one fact is worth pointing out: the optimal coalition size under targeted punishment is greater than that under collective punishment. It is because when the rebellion fails, free riders will not be punished by the government; therefore, the marginal benefit of being a free rider is larger under targeted punishment than under collective punishment. Consequently, the leader needs to recruit more followers to satisfy the participation condition in this case.
Conclusion {sec:conclusio
In this article, I present a coordination model in which a rebel leader forms a rebel group to overthrow an incumbent. This model is different with the existing literature in three aspects: First, I model a trade-off, faced by a rebel leader, between trying to mobilize more supporters and preventing information leaks. In such a scenario, rebellions are not necessarily likely to succeed because of the increased number of involved players. Second, this model, to my knowledge, is the first coordination game that allows the player to endogenously select the coalition size. Third, this model tests two widely adopted punishment rules to determine which one is more useful in preventing a rebellion.
I identify equilibria under two punishment rules and find that the rebel group size is smaller under collective punishment than that under targeted punishment because the latter is subject to a free-rider problem. From the perspective of institutional design, targeted punishment is more effective in preventing a rebellion when social anti-authority sentiment is high and being a free rider is attractive because an authority can become flexible and make people hesitate joining a risky rebellion. Thus, participation is lowered.
The model suggests several valuable implications. When the primary threat to authority comes from citizens who are driven by the anti-government sentiment, targeted punishment should be used to prevent rebellions. However, when the primary threat comes from a rebellion staged by people driven by monetary rewards, collective punishment should be adopted. This model also addresses the case when a leader can select whether to punish free riders if the rebellion succeeds; in this instance, both the authority and the rebel leader may use harsh methods to push free riders to choose sides.
This model sheds light on future research in regime change and coordination models. First, following the majority corroboration game, this study assumes that a single individuals decision will not affect the equilibrium result because of the continuity of the players' set. However, a discrete set of players should also be considered, such as a small scale coup, in which each individuals decision may be pivotal in the game. Second, when the coalition size is endogenously determined, trust among rebel group members is another important issue, which can lead the regime change model to a multidimensional case. Finally, another possible extension is to endogenize the reward sharing rule among rebel group members by considering the commitment problem.
Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1. : If a follower plays a strategy that turn in the leader for sure regardless the type x i , x 0 and size L, i.e. s(x i , x 0 , L) = −1, then no rebellion can succeed. Therefore each follower has no incentive to deviate given other followers' strategies. Given the followers' strategies, It is obvious the best response for the leader is to choose L = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. :
is greater than the finite positive constant α(k + b+q+t T −s ). Since f is increasing in k and
is decreasing monotonically in k by the monotone hazard rate property of the normal density function. It implies that
is decreasing monotonically in k for k > − b+q+t T −s . Thus we need to show that
passes through α. First we have lim
The first equality is due to l'Hopital's rule and the fact that φ (x) = −xφ(x), the second equality is algebra, and the last equality uses the fact that f k = α and f is increasing in k. Therefore,û is single peaked, When k approaches +∞, 1 − Φ(f ) goes to 0, therefore, lim
2. It is straightforward when take derivative with respect to M .
Proof of Proposition 2. :
Sinceû is single peaked and increases in M , therefore there exists a M min , such that the peak ofû tangent to zero, i.e max
Therefore there exist finite k satisfying (4).
Necessity: When the finite k satisfying (4) exists, then we must have max
Proof of Corollary 1. :
1. By implicit function theory,
where Φ −1
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. : From Lemma 1, u 0 increases with x 0 because
Define the following notations:
I describe the intuition of proof of Proposition 4 first. When M → +∞, the smaller root of ∆u cn (k, M ) converges to − t T −v which is less than the smaller root of ∆u nb (k, M ) converging to − q−I v−s . It implies that when M is large, k c solved from ∆u cn (k, M ) is less than k s solved from ∆u nb (k, M ), therefore two-cutoff strategy does not exists, only one-cutoff strategy exists. When M decreases until u c (k, M ) = u n (k, M ) = u b (k, M ), then two-cutoff strategy begin to replace one-cutoff strategy.
Proof of Proposition 4. : First, we prove some properties for the notations defined above. Similar as Lemma 1, u cn is also single peaked, and increases with M . Then there exists a M min C such that ∆u cn (k, M min C ) = 0 has one finite root. For any M > M min C , ∆u cn (k, M ) = 0 has two roots. For any M < M min C , ∆u cn (k, M ) = 0 has no finite root.
We use k l and k h to denote the small and large root respectively, for ∆u cn (k) = 0, when they exist. Since we only care about small root k l , I only focus on k l , k h has the similar properties. By the Implicate Function Theory, it is easy to should k l is a decreasing function of M.
Next, we can find that u c (k l (M ), M ) decreases with M. It is because
, take derivative w.r.t M on both side, we have
, we have
. Similar as the proof in Lemma 1, we have
Similarly there exists a M min E such that ∆u nb (k, M min E ) = 0 has one finite root. For any M > M min E , ∆u nb (k, M ) = 0 has two roots. For any M < M min E , ∆u nb (k, M ) = 0 has no finite root. We use k l to denote the small root for ∆u nb (k) = 0, if it exists. It is easy to show that k l is a decreasing function of M and u c (k
Since T > v > s we can wisely choose α and β which are functions of σ , σ 0 , σ θ and m θ to guarantee the existence of M med , and it is easy to see that M med > M min 
Let (x min 0 , L m ) be the pair satisfying
We next proof the first part of the proposition. 1. Sufficiency: For any (x 0 , L) such that (4) does have finite solutions, we only consider the smaller solution which is denoted as k.
Next, we will show that there does not exist two thresholds pair (k s , k c ) which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium in this case. If there exists a pair (k s , k c ) which is consistent with the equilibrium for given (x 0 , L), it must satisfies:
25 These system of equations are based on the assumption thatθ = k c − σ
), i.e. the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition, the equilibrium conditions should be: Equation (7) indicates a type k c follower should be indifferent between joining the rebellion and remaining neutral. Equation (8) indicates that a type k s follower must be indifferent between remaining neutral and turning in the leader. Inequality (9) indicates that k c and k s solved from (7) and (8) must be consistent with the assumption that the participation condition dominates the maintaining secrecy condition. Inequality (10) is needed to indicate that k c should be the threshold that separates the acts of joining a rebellion and of remaining neutral, whereas k s must be the threshold that isolates the actions of remaining neutral and of turning the leader in. 26 These system of equations are based on the assumption thatθ = k
), i.e. the maintaining secrecy condition dominates the participation condition, the equilibrium conditions should be:
Without loss of generality, we assume (k s , k c ) satisfies (7)- (10) 
it is because the left hand side of (8) is a increasing function of k s and k c > k s . Then we have (7)- (10). Similarly it is easy to show that there is no (k s , k c ) satisfying (11)- (14).
Necessity: When one cutoff threshold k(x 0 , L) exist, then equation (4) must hold. Similar as the proof in Proposition 2, we have
Next, we focus on the second part of the proposition. 2. Sufficiency: For any (x 0 , L) with
and k s (x 0 , L) be the solutions for equation (7) and (12) respectively.
For this fixed
, then when we choose a larger L, the solution k s (x 0 , L) will increase and k c (x 0 , L) will decrease, therefore the left hand side of this inequality will decrease and the right hand side of this inequality will increase. We continuously Similarly, when k c − σ
, we can decrease L to reach the equality, and let L be the solution to hold the equality.
We must have L (x 0 ) = L (x 0 ), it is because any k c (x 0 , L) satisfying (7) is monotonously decreasing with L, and k s (x 0 , L) satisfying (12) is monotonously increasing with L, therefore (k c (x 0 , L), k s (x 0 , L)) satisfying (7), (12) and
For a given x 0 and L, first, we focus on the case when M min (7)- (9), it must satisfies (10).
Proof of Claim
Let k c be the solution solved from (7). For a given k c solved from (7), let k s be the solution solved from (8), assume (10) is not satisfied.
When
The first equality comes from that k c is solved from (7) and the definition of u n . The second inequality comes from that M = (6) . The last equality is the definition of u b . Since
is an increasing function of k s , and we have
Therefore we have k s solved from (8) is less than k c solved from (7), which is a contradiction. ,
Proof of Claim 2: Assume we have
and (7) and (8) 
which is a contradiction with Claim 1. Therefore the claim is proved. Now we can claim that for any given x 0 and L with x 0 > x med 0 and M min
, finite k c and k s can be solved from (7) and (8), and these solutions are consistent with the condition (9) and (10) due to Claim 1 and Claim 2.
Next, define x min 0 satisfies M min
, we have the following claim: (7) and (8), then we have
Proof of Claim 3: For the given x 0 with x min (7) and (12) 
is the unique L satisfying satisfy (7) and (12) 
. By the continuity of the solution, we can choose a L c with L − L c < c such that the solution k c (x 0 , L c ) and k s (x 0 , L c ) solved from (7) and (8) has the following property that
). It means that we choose L c smaller than but close enough to L (x 0 ) such that the increase of k c is larger than the increase of k s . Then we have
Next, we need to show that this L c can be found. (7) and (8) 
. So far, we prove that when M min
, which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium.
The case that when M min
is similar with the discussion above.
Necessity: When two cutoff thresholds (k s (x 0 , L), k c (x 0 , L)) exist, then x 0 and L must satisfy either Also, for any x 0 and L with M min
then k c and k s can only be solved from (7) and (8), however, these solutions cannot satisfy (9). Similarly, for any x 0 and L with M min
then k c and k s can only be solved from (11) and (12), however, these solutions cannot satisfy (13). Finally, when M min
, then no finite k c and k s can be solved.
Proof of Corollary 2. It is straightforward from the proof of Proposition 4.
Define some notations:
and φ 1 is Φ 1 's density function.
and φ 2 is Φ 2 's density function.
and φ 3 is Φ 3 's density function. On the equilibrium path, k c is solved from
By Implicit Function Theory,
where
Proof of Proposition 5. For any given
then by the continuity of the solutions we have k s = k c = k. After that, when L continuously increasing, there only exists one cutoff threshold k(x 0 , L) which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium andθ(
then by the continuity of the solutions we have k s = k c = k. After that, when L continuously decreasing, there only exists one cutoff threshold k(L, x 0 ) which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium andθ(
Therefore the best choice of L is E + C. For a given x 0 with x min 0 < x 0 < x med 0 , we know there is no L such that one-cutoff strategy exists. Therefore, the optimal coalition size under two-cutoff case is L such that
, through whichθ(L, x 0 ) can reach the minimal point and the leader's utility achieves the maximal point.
On the equilibrium path, since
Since when x 0 = x med 0 , the best L is E + C on the equilibrium path, and L (x 0 ) is continuous and differential with respect to x 0 when x 0 < x med 0 , then we know
< 0 is not always true, then there exists x 0 such that
β. However, since k c > k s , we have
Proof of Proposition 6. Similar as Proposition 3, it is because leader's utility function increases in x 0 . When x 0 < x med 0 in TP, the leader would select L * (x 0 ) to stage a rebellion and the threshold for the followers would be k s (L * (x 0 ), x 0 ) and k c (L * (x 0 ), x 0 ) on the equilibrium path. The thresholds satisfy the following equations:
, the leader chooses L * = E + C and we have k c (L * , x 0 ) = k s (L * , x 0 ). With the same x 0 = x med 0 in CP, the leader would also choose L * = E + C to stage a rebellion and the cutoff threshold for the followers satisfies the following equation.
(
we have
Proof of Proposition 7. On the equilibrium path, when T − v = a, for any given 0 , there exist a T 1 and a v 1 such that when
It is because for given T and v,
; and when v increases k s decreases, and k c − k s increases, therefore
is an increasing function of v on the equilibrium path when x 0 < x med 0 . Furthermore when 
, it meansx CP 0 (θ) <x T P 0 (θ). Therefore, TP has higher survival probability in this case when θ >θ.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is similar as the proof of Proposition 7, we just give a sketch as follow. Let t + I and v − s smaller enough to guarantee 0 (θ) >x T P 0 (θ). Therefore, CP has higher survival probability in this case when θ >θ .
Proof of Proposition 9. In TP, by Proposition 4, M med is the M such that u c (k, M ), u b (k, M ), and u b (k, M ) intersect at the same point. Since u c (k, M ) is an increasing function of t, therefore M med is an decreasing function of t. It means x med 0 decreases with t. When t is larger enough, then there will be a intersection of u c (k, M ), u n (k, M ) and u c (k, M ). It means in the large t case, when M decrease, u n (k, M ) and u b (k, M ) will separate before the intersection of u c (k, M ), u n (k, M ) bypass the intersection of u n (k, M ), u b (k, M ). Therefore there is only one threshold which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3. In this case, the type x i follower's expected payoffs for remaining neutral under TP is (1 − Φ(θ T P (x 0 , L) − (1 − ψ)λx i − ψx 0 − (1 − ψ)(1 − λ)m θ σ ))(vx i − q).
The equilibrium strategy for the supporters can be calculated using the same way in Proposition 4. Let k s 3 (x 0 , L) and k c 3 (x 0 , L) be the two thresholds which are consistent with the cutoff equilibrium for the two-cutoff strategy. For a given x 0 on the equilibrium path, k s 3 (x 0 , L), k c 3 (x 0 , L) and the optimal L 3 (x 0 ) chosen by the leader must satisfy the following equations:
Then we have that is the minimal x 0 to make the finite threshold exist which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium. It is easy to find when q increases, x med 0 will decrease, and x min 0 T P will increase. Therefore, there exists a thresholdq such that when q >q, then there is no two cutoff thresholds which is consistent with the cutoff equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 10. The proof is very similar to Lemma 4, instead of repeating the whole procedure, I describe the intuition of the proof here. Since , the influence M can never achieve M med T R regardless of L, therefore only one-cutoff strategy exists. Furthermore, in one-cutoff strategy, the optimal coalition size is E + C which balance the participation and maintaining secrecy conditions. 3. When x med 0 T R ≤ x 0 , the influence M can exceed M med T R , which lead to the existence of two-cutoff strategy. For any given x 0 in this case, if L is chosen such that k c T R and k s T R exist which satisfy (7)-(10), then we can enlarge L to solve k c T R and k s T R such that (24)- (26) are satisfied. Similarly, when a given x 0 and L leading to k c T R and k s T R satisfying (11)- (14), then we can reduce L to solve k c T R and k s T R such that (24)- (26) 
